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Lines in the Sand: Drawing Meaningful Contours for the
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine
(In a World at War)
Malissa M. Tucker1

Genocide, war crimes, and human rights atrocities have long plagued modern human
civilization.2 Some of the most tragic instances have occurred recently, beginning with the
Holocaust, and including other major loss of human life in Rwanda, Cambodia, Iraq, and the
Balkans.3 Despite this troubling history, mass – but preventable – human suffering continues today,
most notably in Syria.4 Although there is some consensus among international stakeholders that
a “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) exists, many, including the United States, continue to struggle
with defining and implementing a workable humanitarian intervention policy.5 This article argues
that in order to fulfill its recognized R2P obligations, the United States must clarify its humanitarian
intervention strategy and become a genuine leader in the R2P movement. In doing so the United
States should build a consensus on what the R2P doctrine means and requires, as well as be willing
to act in the face of humanitarian crises.
Without a well-structured R2P agenda, the United States has failed to stop troubling national
security dilemmas, calling into question its commitment to protecting vulnerable populations, and
adding to skepticism in the international community over whether R2P is a worthwhile policy.6 This
ambiguity stymies dialogue on the duty owed to vulnerable people and inhibits action in the face of
grave atrocities.7 Importantly, the United States has not yet established the Responsibility to Protect
as a legal norm. Rather, R2P has been regarded as an important, but increasingly superficial, moral
and national security obligation – one that critics have argued to overhaul, or worse, to do away
1 J.D. Candidate, May 2016, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A., 2010, American
Military University. The author would like to thank her husband James and Professor Sandra Hodgkinson for their
inspiration and support in crafting this article. She also gives her sincerest gratitude to the American University
Washington College of Law, National Security Law Brief staff for this opportunity and their insightful feedback.
2 Ben Kiernan, Blood and Soil: The Global history of Genocide, Open Democracy (Oct. 11, 2007), https://www.opendemocracy.
net/article/blood_and_soil_the_global_history_of_genocide.
3 United Human Rights Council, Genocide in Rwanda, available at http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/genocide/genocide_in_
rwanda.htm (last accessed Mar. 24, 2015) (noting that in Rwanda, during April 1994, over 800,000 Tutsi men, women,
and children were slaughtered by extremists from the rival ethnic Hutu faction); See also Rwandan Genocide: 100 Days of
Slaughter, BBC News, (Apr. 7, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506.
4 United To End Genocide, Syria, http://endgenocide.org/conflict-areas/syria/ (last accessed Oct. 21, 2014).
5 Responsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time Has Come—And Gone?, The Economist (July 23, 2009), http://www.
economist.com/node/14087788 (discussing criticisms by U.N. member states of the manner in which the United States
and other countries have wielded R2P).
6 Id.
7 . Id.
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with completely.8 Many countries, including Russia and China, have historically been reluctant to
support United Nations (U.N.) intervention, and critics contend that the United States likewise has
not clearly signaled its willingness to adopt the very legal, social, or political framework necessary to
make the R2P doctrine viable.9
This article examines why the United States must lead the international community in
implementing a genuine and practicable R2P doctrine, and where we have failed at upholding
our duty to protect. Part I of this article introduces the Responsibility to Protect and provides
a historical overview of how it arose. In Part II, this article analyzes how the United States has
attempted to implement humanitarian intervention using several case studies in Kosovo, Libya, and
Syria. In Part III, this article explores why the issue of R2P is so critical for U.S. national security,
the drivers behind the international community’s failure to meaningfully implement R2P, and gives
suggestions for changing those drivers. Finally, this article argues that the responsibility to protect
can only become an impactful and truly sound policy if the United States leads the international
community in resolving the surrounding ambiguity, indecisiveness, and inaction. A renewed U.S.
commitment to R2P will help create the legal norms, political will, and partnerships necessary to
prioritize national security, justice, and most importantly, the protection of human life.
I. The Great Awakening: Defining R2P and the “Movement Toward Human Security”
The R2P doctrine is rooted in the concept of humanitarian military intervention, which has
been practiced since at least the end of the Cold War.10 It was not until 2005 at the United Nations
World Summit, that the international community came to a consensus on needing to institutionalize
R2P as a norm.11 Since 2005, proponents of R2P have struggled to make it a meaningful or
effective practice among international stakeholders.12 The following discussion documents this
troubled evolution, and highlights the reasons why there is debate surrounding humanitarian military
intervention in general.13
A. Defining the Responsibility to Protect
The term “responsibility to protect” is based on a long history of international humanitarian
8 Jayshree Bajoria & Robert McMahon, The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention, Council of Foreign Relations (Jun.
12, 2013), available at http://www.cfr.org/humanitarian-intervention/dilemma-humanitarian-intervention/p16524.
9 Id.
10 The Responsibility To Protect, Report of The International Commission on Intervention And State Sovereignty, available at
http://www.idrc.ca/EN/Resources/Publications/openebooks/960-7/index.html (last accessed Mar. 23, 2015).
11 Report of the Secretary-General, Responsibility To Protect: Timely And Decisive Response, U.N. GAOR, 66th Sess., U.N.
Doc. No. A/66/874–S/2012/578 (July, 25, 2012).
12 Id.
13 Chaim Kaufmann, See No Evil: Why America Doesn’t Stop Genocide, Foreign Affairs (July/Aug. 2002), available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58061/chaim-kaufmann/see-no-evil-why-america-doesn-t-stop-genocide (asserting that America
has failed to stop genocide due to a lack of knowledge, will, and action); See also Bajoria, supra note 7 (noting that the U.S.
has tempered its use of R2P due to past bad precedent and the ambiguity of a workable legal framework for compelling
action).
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crises, but it was not until the Rwandan genocide of the 1990s that the term became widely
adopted.14 At its heart the doctrine stands for the precept that the international community cannot
passively watch people become the subjects of genocide, war crimes, or human rights atrocities.15
Instead, international actors will use necessary means – including military action – to prevent,
identify, and end such crimes. Since its inception, the U.N. and U.S. policy communities have
reiterated that R2P stands on three pillars.16 First, individual states have a duty to protect their
populations from atrocities. 17 Second, international community members have an obligation to help
states fulfill this duty, including by “assisting those which are under stress, before crises and conflicts
break out.”18 Third, in accordance with the U.N. Charter, including Chapter VII, the international
community should take coordinated and “collective action” in cases where states fail to protect their
populations.19
Despite a common understanding about the need to stop atrocities, the R2P doctrine has not
come full-circle to enact the protections that it promises. No single actor has undertaken the task
of resolving the ambiguities and failures responsible for R2P shortfalls, though many, including the
United States, have tried to apply the still-nascent policy to evolving global crises.20 This haphazard
application of R2P reveals the need to develop and strengthen the doctrine, and has also presented
unintended impediments to practicing humanitarian intervention in the future by setting some
arguably bad precedent.21
Despite this inconsistent application of the R2P doctrine, the United States has taken pains
to reiterate its commitment to, in the words of President Obama, “never again” allow genocide and
other atrocities to take place without a coordinated international response.22 In April 2012, President
Obama drew applause from an audience gathered at the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C.
when he asserted that the prevention of genocide and human rights atrocities were “a core national
security interest and a core moral responsibility of the United States.”23 He added that “awareness
14 R2P: A Short History, United Nations Regional Information Centre for Western Europe, http://www.unric.
org/en/responsibility-to-protect/26981-r2p-a-short-history (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
15 White House Press Release, Remarks by the President at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (Apr. 23, 2012,
10:00 AM), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2012/04/23/president-obama-speaks-preventing-massatrocities#transcript.
16 Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 10; See also Responsibility to Protect Working Group, United States
Institute of Peace, available at http://www.usip.org/programs/projects/responsibility-protect-working-group (last accessed Mar. 24,
2015).
17 Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 10.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 See, e.g., Jayshree Bajoria, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect, The Council on Foreign Relations (Mar. 24, 2011),
http://www.cfr.org/libya/libya-responsibility-protect/p24480 (describing one such application in Libya by the United
States and the international community).
21 See The Economist, supra note 4.
22 White House Press Release, supra note 14.
23 Id.; See Thomas Omestad, USIP, Partners Release Report on Realizing ‘Responsibility to Protect’, U.S. Inst. Of Peace, Jul.
23, 2013, http://www.usip.org/publications/usip-partners-release-report-realizing-responsibility-protect; See also Jonas Claes, Obama
Announces Formation of the Atrocities Prevention Board, U.S. Inst. Of Peace, , Apr. 23, 2012, http://www.usip.org/publications/
obama-announces-formation-the-atrocities-prevention-board.
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without action changes nothing” and that the promise of “never again” was a “challenge to us
all – to pause and to look within.” 24 With this apt invitation to evaluate what the responsibility to
protect mandates, we first must survey of how the R2P doctrine came into being.
B. History of the Responsibility to Protect
Before the R2P doctrine was formalized, it was practiced as humanitarian military
intervention in a limited number of cases in the 1990s.25 In many of those instances, intervention
was unsuccessful at stopping the massive loss of life and atrocities that came to characterize the
post-Cold War era – and no single mission wholly prevented atrocities from starting in the first
place.26 This early chapter of humanitarian intervention revealed deep-seated division over whether
it was an appropriate practice, and how and when it should be invoked.27 This period also tested
international community members’ willingness to prioritize the protection of innocent people.28
To a large extent, these issues were not resolved but exacerbated by the introduction of R2P as an
emerging yet nebulous intervention model.29 To understand why, it is useful to look at how genocide
became commonplace and how international actors responded or failed to respond.
i. One by One: How Genocide Became Commonplace and Why We Struggled to Stop It
Humanitarian military intervention emerged relatively recently, following the end of the
Cold War.30 Western nations, bolstered by the “defeat” of Communism, began to survey a world
full of potential, but with unfortunate disparity and volatility, especially in post-Communist and
persistently underdeveloped states. 31 As Jon Western and Joshua Goldstein observe, after the end
of the Cold War “A new and unsettled world order took shape, one seemingly distinguished by the
frequency and brutality of wars and the deliberate targeting of civilians,” all of which took center
stage in a globalizing and quickly technologically advancing world.32 This “new world order” called
into question the inviolability of state sovereignty, and the role of the international community in
preventing and stopping human atrocities.33
Leading up to and during the post-Cold War period, several events in particular shocked
24 White House Press Release, supra note 14.
25 Article 28: Right to Social and International Order Permitting These Freedoms To Be Released, BBC News, http://www.bbc.
co.uk/worldservice/people/features/ihavearightto/four_b/casestudy_art28.shtml (last accessed Mar. 23, 2015).
26 See generally Bajoria, supra note 7.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Jon Western & Joshua S. Goldstein, Humanitarian Intervention Comes of Age: Lessons From Somalia to Libya, Foreign
Affairs (Nov./Dec. 2011), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136502/jon-western-and-joshua-s-goldstein/
humanitarian-intervention-comes-of-age.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Walden Bello, The Checkered History of Humanitarian Intervention, Transnational Institute (Sep. 6, 2013), available at
http://www.tni.org/print/article/checkered-history-humanitarian-intervention.
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the global conscience. These instances provided the basis for the humanitarian intervention we
know today. In 1987 and again in 1988, the world witnessed an outright failure to protect Iraq’s
Kurdish minority. The Iraqi government, led by then-president Saddam Hussein, gassed Iraqi Kurds
with lethal mixtures of sarin, tabun, mustard, and VX gas, and killed thousands of others, often
discarding their bodies in mass graves.34 According to media reports, an estimated 3,200-5,000
people died in a single gas attack in the village of Halabja, and many survivors continue to suffer
long-term adverse health effects, such as congenital birth defects and high cancer rates.35
Although, as U.S. Ambassador Samantha Power points out, the United States did not
deem the actions against the Kurds as “genocide” until 1995, and no Iraqi was ever prosecuted
internationally for their involvement the attacks, the interceding years provided a brief glimpse of
humanitarian military intervention in practice.36 In 1991, Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait sparked the
100-hour First Gulf War.37 At the start of the conflict, the United States encouraged those under
Hussein’s rule, including the Kurds who had been slaughtered several years earlier, to rebel against
the Iraqi government.38 Notably, the United States did nothing to support the rebellion militarily,
but along with their NATO partners, eventually provided “safehaven” under Operation Provide
Comfort to Kurds fleeing Iraqi retaliation. 39 This protection was necessary, but only occurred after
an estimated tens of thousands of people had already been killed and countless thousands more had
gone missing.40
The U.N. Security Council had not explicitly authorized collective military action in Iraq,
choosing instead to issue U.N. Resolution 688, which sought to end the “repression of the Iraqi
civilian population,” including the Kurds, and left the door open for invoking Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter if Iraq did not comply.41 Citing the Resolution as authority, NATO partners instituted
a no-fly zone in northern Iraq.42 The Resolution did not explicitly provide for such a measure,
prompting the U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to later condemn the imposition of
the no-fly zones as “illegal.”43 Despite the disagreement over what collective action was legal and
34 Saddam’s Iraq: Key Events, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/02/iraq_events/html/chemical_
warfare.stm (last accessed Dec. 1, 2014); See also Samantha Power, A Problem From Hell: America And The Age Of
Genocide 197, 241 (2013).
35 Saddam’s Iraq, supra note 33; See also Power, supra note 33, at 188-90.
36 Power, supra note 33, at 245.
37 The First Gulf War, U.S. Dep’t of State, https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/firstgulf (last accessed
Dec. 15, 2014).
38 Power, supra note 33, at 237.
39 Id. at 241; See also Saddam’s Iraq, supra note 33.
40 Power, supra note 33, at 240-41; See also BBC News, supra note 33.
41 S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR S/22442 (Apr. 5, 1991), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/
GEN/NR0/596/24/IMG/NR059624.pdf ?OpenElement.
42 See UN Security Council Resolution 688, Iraq, Council on Foreign Relations (Apr. 5, 1991), http://www.cfr.org/
international-organizations-and-alliances/un-security-council-resolution-688-iraq/p11206 (noting that the no-fly
zone “was not explicit in the resolution” but that NATO partners believed it was implied “in order to protect both
ground troops entering the area and airdrops of aid to the Kurdish population.”); See also Ctr. for the study of
interventionism, UN Security Council Resolution 688 on Iraq (5 Apr. 1991), http://www.interventionism.info/en/UNSC-Res-688
(last accessed Dec. 14, 2014) (submitting that Boutros-Ghali labeled the no-fly zones as “illegal” in a 2003 interview).
43 See id.
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necessary in Iraq, Ambassador Power notes that the Operation “marked unprecedented intervention
in the internal affairs of a state for humanitarian reasons.”44
Then, in September 1992, U.S. Marines landed in Somalia to restore humanitarian assistance
amid a raging civil war in that country.45 Despite the earlier operation in Iraq, this brand of U.S.
humanitarian military intervention was still not an established practice, and the mission quickly
expanded to restoring Somalia’s government, including by using Special Operations Forces (“SOF”)
to remove local warlords.46 In October 1993, during one such SOF mission, America’s humanitarian
intervention in Somalia took a catastrophic turn when local insurgents killed 18 U.S. service
members in the famed “Black Hawk Down” incident.47 Understandably, this tragedy added to an
already skittish intervention policy – one that Mark Bowden, journalist and observer of the Somali
campaign, said caused “an excessive concern [to] avoid risking American forces on the ground” in
the 1990s, and that “continues to play a role in foreign policy decisions” today.48
While the United States recalculated its role as intervener after Somalia, intra-state and
regional conflict continued to proliferate and produce atrocities across the globe for well over the
next decade.49 Between 1992 and 1995, the breakup of former Yugoslavia hurled the defunct state’s
six provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia
into an inter-ethnic civil war.50 Under the authoritarian rule of staunch Serbian nationalist Slobodan
Milosevic, Serb forces began “cleansing” their territory of ethnic Muslims and Croats in Bosnia after
the region declared independence in 1992.51
Despite ample warning regarding the hostilities in former Yugoslavia and credible notice
of the mass killings that were taking place in Bosnia, the United States responded by supporting a
fruitless European-led peace process.52 With peace nowhere in sight, and the borrowed time and
leeway emboldening Serb aggression, American policymakers largely chose to stay out of the fray
because, as Ambassador Power points out, the cause was seen as purely humanitarian – i.e., not one
that directly threatened America’s interests.53
Turmoil in the Balkans would not soon end. In 1995, Milosevic’s forces overran the U.N.
44 Power, supra note 33, at 241.
45 The United States Army in Somalia: 1992-1994, U.S. Army Center of Military History (last visited Mar. 24, 2015),
available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A8364-2004Sep9.html.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 What a Downed Black Hawk in Somalia Taught America, NPR (Oct. 5, 2013, 4:45 PM), http://www.npr.
org/2013/10/05/229561805/what-a-downed-black-hawk-in-somalia-taught-america.
49 Id.
50 Milestones: 1989-1992 - The Breakup of Yugoslavia, 1990-1992, U.S. Dep’t of State (last accessed Mar. 24), https://
history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/breakup-yugoslavia.
51 Id.
52 Id.; See also Power, supra note 33, at 259.
53 Power, supra note 33, at 260-62 (stating that, in evaluating U.S. policy toward Bosnia, Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin
Powell, invoked former defense secretary Caspar Weinberger’s five-part criteria for armed intervention, which required
that military force only be used to (1) protect the “vital interests of the United States or its allies,” (2) with the ultimate
intent to win, (3) in “pursuit of clearly defined political and military objectives,” (4) accompanied by “widespread public
and congressional support,” and (5) used only as a last resort – none of which were present or feasible in Bosnia).
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safe-zone in the city of Srebrenica and began ethnically cleansing the city’s Muslim inhabitants,
murdering an estimated 40,000 before a three-week NATO bombing campaign finally drove
Milosevic to agree to stop attacking civilians.54 In 1999, as tensions once again flared, this time
in the Bosnian province of Kosovo, NATO, backed largely by U.S. military power, conducted the
first substantial humanitarian military intervention campaign to prevent Serbs from committing yet
another genocide. 55 Given its pivotal nature, the Kosovo campaign will be discussed in depth in
Part II, where this article evaluates U.S. intervention strategies.
Amid the conflict in former Yugoslavia yet another tragedy unfolded, this time in Rwanda.
In April 1994, “extremists” from the rival ethnic Hutu faction slaughtered over 800,000 Tutsi
men, women, and children.56 In one infamous and chilling account, seven Tutsi pastors who had
taken refuge among hundreds in a local church, asked the Hutu bishop there to intercede in their
slaughter.57 The Hutu bishop never did and was later indicted at The Hague for allegedly organizing
the massacre.58 Despite these troubling reflections, the world was still slow to react. 59 For its part,
the United States did virtually nothing to stop the conflict. 60 In fact, U.S. officials did not publicly
recognize the killings as genocide until long after they had occurred. 61
In total, the end of the twentieth century left the international community with a gruesome
prospect – refuse to intervene in the name of state sovereignty and continue to watch helpless
civilians die, or rethink the way we viewed, and held ourselves accountable for, using all means
necessary to stop bona fide human suffering.62 Though the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 had loosely
54 See id. at 391-95, 439-40 (detailing the horrific ethnic cleansing campaign undertaken by Milosevic in July 1995
against Muslim inhabitants of Srebrenica and the tragically late efforts of the U.S. to spur NATO involvement, which
did not commence to stp the genocide until Aug. 30, 1995).
55 See id. at 443, 446-47 (noting that after Serb forces began attacking ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, the negotiated
peace settlement fell through and the U.S. more readily responded by urging and executing a NATO bombing campaign
than they had in any previous Balkans conflict).
56 Genocide in Rwanda, United Human Rights Council, http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/genocide/genocide_in_
rwanda.htm (last accessed Mar. 23, 2015) (noting that in Rwanda, during April 1994, over 800,000 Tutsi men, women,
and children were slaughtered by extremists from the rival ethnic Hutu faction); See also Rwandan Genocide: 100 Days of
Slaughter, BBC News (Apr. 6, 2014, 8:25 PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506.
57 C-SPAN Interview with Philip Gourevitch, Author of We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With
Our Families (Nov. 22, 1998), available at http://www.booknotes.org/Watch/115511-1/Philip+Gourevitch.aspx (last accessed Mar.
23, 2015).
58 Id.
59 Genocide in Rwanda, supra note 55 (noting that “Policymakers in France, Belgium, and the United States and at the
United Nations were aware of the preparations for massive slaughter and failed to take the steps needed to prevent it.
Aware from the start that Tutsi were being targeted for elimination, the leading foreign actors refused to acknowledge
the genocide.”); See also 100 Days of Slaughter, supra note 55.
60 Kaufmann, supra note 12 (asserting that there were only cursory recommendations to resurrect defunct peace
accords and no “high-level meeting of foreign policy principals was ever held, with the result that no one demanded
any serious analyses of the crisis. This fact alone virtually assured that no rescue plans could be developed, and midlevel officials who attempted to raise this issue were branded naive or alarmist. The U.S. response to Rwanda, in short,
constituted a classic case of non-evaluation”).
61 Glen Kessler and Colum Lynch, U.S. Calls Killings in Sudan Genocide, Washington Post (Sep. 10, 2004),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A8364-2004Sep9.html; See also Kaufmann, supra note 12.
62 Outreach Program on the Rwanda Genocide & the U.N., Background Note: The Responsibility to Protect (Mar. 2014),

32

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF

Vol. 5, No. 2

established the concept of state sovereignty, much had changed in the 352 years since.63 Now, with
global relations more interconnected and internal state matters more ascertainable than ever, our
understanding of sovereignty had to shift to fit a new paradigm.64
This shift allowed international stakeholders to begin critically analyzing what duties an
autonomous state owed their people for having the ‘privilege’ of independence.65 The shift also
served to illuminate the international duty to intervene when a state failed to uphold those duties.66
In 2000, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan remarked “If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an
unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to gross
and systematic violation of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?”67
Annan’s point was clear: If sovereignty was not an infallible shield under which rulers were allowed
to slaughter their own people, the world needed to find a legal and legitimate way to challenge it and
to protect human life in the process.68
ii. A New World Order, New World Solutions: International Responses to an Age Old Controversy
By 2001, surveying the tumult of the 1990s and responding to Secretary General Annan’s
challenge, some governments decided it was time to establish a norm on intervention.69 Canada’s
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty was the first to offer a newly
named framework for intervention – “The Responsibility to Protect” – and to undertake an
explanation of what that responsibility required.70 In their seminal report on R2P, the Commission
noted that, “the issue of intervention for human protection purposes has been seen as one of the
most controversial and difficult of all international relations questions.”71 The report, published just
three months after the 9/11 attacks, struggled to contemplate how these brazen acts of international
terrorism would impact the R2P landscape, but nonetheless made the case for never again allowing
genocide and atrocities to transpire while the international community remained haplessly entangled
in the debate over what to do.72
The report raised several significant points. First, it argued that the Responsibility to Protect
available at http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/pdf/Backgrounder%20R2P%202014.pdf.
63 See Derek Croxton, The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 & The Origins of Sovereignty, XXI, No. 3 The Int’l History Rev.
569, 579-82 (1999) (discussing how the Treaty of Westphalia did not explicitly establish the concept of sovereignty,
rather the concept was implied by the framers’ intent & the customary practices that developed in response to its
implementation).
64 See, e.g., Western, supra note 29.
65 See, e.g., International Development Research Center, The Responsibility to Protect, International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty vii (Dec. 2001).
66 Id.
67 U.N. Millennium Assembly Report of the Secretary-General, We The Peoples, The Role of the United
Nations in the 21-st Century, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/54/2000 (Mar. 27, 2000); See also Outreach
Program, supra note 61 at 1.
68 See id.
69 See, e.g., Int’l Dev. Research Ctr., supra note 64 at vii.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
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had three parts: to prevent, to react, and to rebuild, with prevention being the most important
cornerstone of the doctrine. 73 The report also judged that military action was at the extreme end
of the responsibility spectrum, just and appropriate only where there was objectively perceived or
real “large scale loss of life” or “large scale ethnic cleansing” taking place.74 To invoke collective
military action, the report suggested that four precautionary principles needed to be met: (1) the
primary intention had to be to end human suffering; (2) military action had to be used only as a “last
resort”; (3) applied only through proportional means; and (4) with reasonable prospects of success.
75
Finally, the report stressed that to be legal, any action needed to comply with the U.N. Charter
and be approved by the U.N. Security Council. 76
Finally, at the 2005 U.N. World Summit, world leaders agreed to adopt the Responsibility to
Protect as a guiding principle, setting a new custom for intervention.77 U.N. Special Adviser Edward
Luck explained that the impetus for international community members adopting R2P grew out of
the idea that a policy shift from “non-interference to non-indifference” was necessary. 78 Invoking
the memories of past genocide and other atrocities in the Balkans, Rwanda, and Cambodia, Luck
noted that R2P was a “movement toward human security.”79 Luck added that the framework for
R2P was still being developed, but he echoed the requirement that any action under the doctrine
must comply with the U.N. Charter and have Security Council approval.80
The United States worked to give special significance to R2P, building on its earlier, but
what some have called half-hearted, commitment to end genocide.81 This prior commitment
arose between 1946-1948 when the United States spearheaded the drafting of the Convention on
Genocide.82 As critics have noted, however, the United States did not ratify the Convention until 40
years later in 1987, with the passage of the Proxmire Act, also known as the Genocide Convention
Implementation Act of 1987.83 This created America’s first – and only – legal obligation to prevent
and end genocide, though critics such as Chaim Kaufmann have also noted that attached to the
obligation are “reservations so crippling that [the United States] is effectively barred from ever
invoking the treaty against anyone.”84
73 Id. at xi.
74 Id. at xii.
75 Id.
76 Id. at xii-xiii.
77 Edward Luck, The Responsibility to Protect, Office of the U.N. Special Advisor on The Prevention of
Genocide, http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/videos/video_5.shtml (last visited Mar. 24, 2015).
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 See Jonas Claes, Responsibility to Protect Weighed Down by Misconceptions, U.S. Inst. of Peace (Aug. 16, 2013), available at
http://www.usip.org/olivebranch/responsibility-protect-weighed-down-misconceptions. (asserting that policymakers in Washington are
familiar with RtP only to a “limited extent”, and that they generally view it as a foreign concept).
82 Kaufmann, supra note 12.
83 Emily Backes, On This Day: U.S. Fully Adopts Genocide Convention, Enough Project (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.
enoughproject.org/blogs/day-us-ratifies-genocide-convention (stating that the Convention has had little impact on ending genocide
and the U.S. more concerned with “avoiding labeling the violence genocide – and thus triggering its obligation to
respond – than actually preventing deaths”).
84 Kaufmann, supra note 12.
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Additionally, President Obama set up an Atrocity Prevention Board (APB) to drive R2P
efforts in the United States, further signaling the United States’s moral commitment to prevent
atrocities.85 Later, as the chair of the APB, Ambassador Power explained, the United States planned
to implement R2P by prioritizing, organizing, and multilateralizing efforts across the international
community.86 To achieve this, the United States Institute of Peace also set up a working group
on R2P.87 The group recommended a framework for implementing R2P, noting that “The
Responsibility to Protect is not a tool, but a guiding principle requiring the consideration of available
measures to address the risk of atrocities, in particular preventive diplomatic, legal, and economic
measures, as well as reactive instruments short of military action.”88 The working group added that
“The use of coercive military force remains a last resort option” where alternatives would prove
inadequate to stop atrocities.89
While these measures signaled the commitment that the international community, and the
United States in particular, made to end genocide and other atrocities, large-scale loss of human life
continues today. The Security Council has only invoked the language of R2P a handful of times,
including against Libya.90 The R2P doctrine has failed to emerge as a meaningful bulwark against
global atrocities, prompting many to ask whether the strategy is worthwhile.91 This article argues
that it is – but advocates for a serious reevaluation of the problems with the doctrine, and more
importantly, the role the United States must play in making R2P impactful, relevant, and sound.
In doing so, we turn first to analyzing three cases in which the need for humanitarian
intervention has surfaced: Kosovo, where prior to the emergence of R2P, the United States engaged
militarily to stop Milosevic’s murder of ethnic Albanians; Libya, where R2P was used to justify the
toppling of the Qaddafi regime; and Syria, where the United States has refused to take military
action against the Syrian government to stop the mass killings ongoing in that country.
II. Intervention in Motion: How the United States Has Struggled to Apply the Responsibility
to Protect
Three cases best demonstrate how the United States has struggled to uphold its
Responsibility to Protect: Kosovo, Libya, and Syria. Within each, there are relative successes
85 Samantha Power, Statement by Ambassador Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, At an
Informal Interactive Dialogue on The Responsibility to Protect, U.S. Mission to the United Nations (Sept. 11, 2013), http://usun.
state.gov/briefing/statements/214066.htm
86 Id. (noting that the U.S. had also enacted the U.N. Arms Trade Treaty which sought to prohibit the flow of
weapons to perpetrators of war crimes and other atrocities).
87 See generally Responsibility to Protect Working Group, U.S. Inst. of Peace available at http://www.usip.org/programs/
projects/responsibility-protect-working-group (last accessed Mar. 24, 2015).
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Michael Doyle, The Folly of Protection: Is Intervention Against Qaddafi’s Regime Legal and Legitimate?, Foreign Affairs
(Mar. 20, 2011), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67666/michael-w-doyle/the-folly-of-protection (noting that “[t]he
Libyan intervention represents only the third time since 2005 that the Security Council has invoked R2P to enforce the
protection of civilians”).
91 See The Economist, supra note 4.
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and failures that must be explored to better ascertain how R2P can be successful and what role
the United States bears in building consensus on the doctrine. We begin first with the NATOled operation in Kosovo, the first U.S.-backed attempt to prevent genocide and atrocities from
occurring.
A. Attempting Prevention: Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, 1999
In March 1999, by the time the United States urged its NATO allies to begin bombing Serb
forces in Kosovo, the Balkan conflict had already taken hundreds of thousands of lives. 92 Milosevic,
not one to be deterred by seemingly empty threats of intervention, had reigned with brutality since
1991 and was responsible for many of these deaths.93 In light of these atrocities, the United States
determined that Milosevic could no longer operate with impunity or make a mockery out of the
U.S. promise to act.94 Thus, when Milosevic continued his killings and rejected a peace settlement,
NATO began bombing Serb forces in March of 1999.95 After the brief NATO bombing campaign
in Srebrenica in 1995, many expected a quick and relatively clean end to the hostilities in Kosovo.96
The Kosovo campaign, however, proved far more complicated and far less decisive than
people expected. The seventy-eight-day bombing campaign failed to prevent thousands of further
casualties, and highlighted ample criticism against intervention.97 As Ambassador Power argues,
the outcome of Kosovo was “mixed at best.”98 In total, the United States very likely saved many
more lives than if they had not acted and eventually helped bring countless war criminals to justice.
99
Nonetheless, critics pounced on the mistakes made during the mission to support the case against
humanitarian intervention.100
Applying Albert Hirschman’s theories of perversity, futility, and jeopardy, Ambassador Power
sought to categorize criticisms of Operations Allied Force and R2P in general.101 She notes that
detractors of Operation Allied Force believed the intervention perverted NATO’s credibility, and
brought to bear a half-hearted humanitarian intervention model that was based on over exaggerated
human suffering.102 On the futility front, critics also levied that there were no bloodless hands in the
intractable “civil war” – an ‘internal issue’ in which the United States had manipulatively chosen to
92 Milestones, supra note 49; See also Interview with Richard Holbrooke, PBS Frontline, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/holbrooke.html (last accessed Mar. 24, 2015).
93 Interview with Richard Holbrooke, supra note 91.
94 See Power, supra note 33, at 445-47 (noting that Clinton administration officials were still reeling from Srebrenica
and that the “duplicitous antics of Milosevic” were making them once again look bad).
95 A Kosovo Chronology, PBS Frontline, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/etc/cron.html (last visited
Mar. 25, 2015).
96 See Power, supra note 33, at 451 (noting that the NATO bombing was “initially executed casually”).
97 Id. at 458.
98 Id. at 460.
99 Id. at 472; See also James Kitfield, Not-So-Sacred Borders, PBS Frontline, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/kosovo/procon/kitfield.html (last accessed Mar. 23, 2015).
100 Power, supra note 33, at 461.
101 Id.
102 Id.; See also Doug Bandow, The U.S. Role in Kosovo, Cato Institute (March 10, 1999).
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cast as genocide.103 Finally, Ambassador Power notes critics’ contentions that Albanian retribution
and the hastening of Milosevic’s slaughter of Albanians were key examples of how intervention not
only accomplished nothing, but actually jeopardized the goals of interveners by exacerbating the
problem.104
Despite these criticisms, Kosovo marked the first time in history that the United States had
mobilized at least a portion of the international community to prevent genocide.105 The importance
of this act cannot be taken for granted, especially as it relates to the emergence of R2P as an
international doctrine a few short years later.106 For all the things the United States had failed to do,
Milosevic was no longer being passively observed as he thumbed his murderous tendencies at the
international community.107 Operation Allied Force accomplished something else as well: it gave
the United States a leading role in pushing the world to act in the face of human atrocity.108 This
outcome, however, has been sullied in the wake of subsequent humanitarian campaigns.109
B. Libya: Real Perversion of Humanitarian Intervention Doctrine?
Whatever lessons should have been gleaned from Kosovo and applied to the precautions
that had since emerged under R2P, the U.S.-supported action in Libya probably served to
undermine.110 In 2011, acting under UN Security Council Resolution 1973, a multinational coalition
began airstrikes in Libya under the auspices of humanitarian intervention.111 Initially, the mission
was heralded as a success, showing that NATO could act decisively and collectively.112 Some
observers even claimed that intervention in Libya had “vindicated” the R2P strategy, and served as
the model for intervention.113
However, the aftermath of the operation in Libya soon came under scrutiny and, as the
facts started to emerge, revealed that R2P had not been used appropriately.114 Instead, according
to scholars such as Alan Kuperman, Libya served as the example of “how not to intervene.”115
103 Power, supra note 33, at 463.
104 Id. at 466.
105 David L. Phillips, Intervention Lessons From Kosovo for Syria, Huffington Post (Nov. 3, 2013), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/david-l-phillips/intervention-lessons-from_b_3858228.html.
106 Outreach Program on the Rwanda Genocide & the U.N., supra note 61.
107 Interview with Richard Holbrooke, supra note 91.
108 Kitfield, supra note 98.
109 Martha H. Findlay, Can R2P Survive Libya and Syria, Canadian Int’l Council 5 (Nov. 2011).
110 Findlay, supra note 108, at 6 (noting that it took only weeks for the Libya mission to shift to ousting al-Qaddafi
through the imposition of the no-fly zone and to supporting rebels).
111 Id.
112 Ivo H. Daalder & James Stavridis, NATO’s Victory in Libya: The Right Way to Run and Intervention, Foreign Affairs
(Mar./Apr. 2012), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137073/ivo-h-daalder-and-james-g-stavridis/natos-victory-in-libya.
113 See id.; See also Stewart Patrick, Libya and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention: How Qaddafi’s Fall Vindicated Obama
and RtoP, Foreign Affairs (Aug. 26, 2011), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68233/stewart-patrick/libya-andthe-future-of-humanitarian-intervention (claiming that the operation was perfectly timed and executed, showing it was possible
to carry out a successful military intervention in the name of R2P).
114 Findlay, supra note 108, at 6-7. .
115 Alan J. Kuperman, Lessons from Libya: How Not to Intervene, Harvard Kennedy School (Sept. 2013) (stating that
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Kuperman argued that the goal in Libya was never really humanitarian intervention at its core. 116
Rather, the goal was to overthrow Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi based on the trumped-up
and poorly vetted accounts of a small group of rebels that asserted that the Libyan government was
indiscriminately targeting civilians.117 In Kuperman’s calculation, NATO’s support to rebel forces
worsened the humanitarian situation and created an environment where instability and extremism
still thrive. 118
With such a skewed outcome to the Libyan intervention, the United States did R2P a
disservice. First, it opened R2P back up to long-standing vulnerabilities and concerns over its
misuse.119 The aftermath of U.S. intervention in Libya gave rise to claims that the United States was
prone to manipulating the numbers and extent of atrocities for their own political ends.120 Second,
it revealed the possibility that the United States used humanitarian intervention as a ruse to defeat its
weaker enemies, while unwittingly (or wittingly) supporting extremists who would ultimately prove
more dangerous than any unsavory dictator.121 Finally, it added to the myriad bad precedents set by
U.S. intervention aboard, and degraded the will necessary to confront future and real atrocities.122
Indeed, critics have often turned back to Libya as an example of why the United States should not
intervene in Syria, where genocide is being documented.123
C. Syria: By No Means Necessary and The Death Toll Rising
In March 2011, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s forces began targeting pro-democracy
demonstrators.124 The government’s arrest, torture, and indiscriminate killing of civilian
demonstrators led to calls for al-Assad’s resignation.125 As tensions and killings escalated, the
demonstrators took up arms against the Syrian government, and by 2012, the conflict had escalated
into a full-scale civil war.126 This war continues to produce casualties today.127
An ongoing U.N. inquiry found that all of the major players in the civil war have committed
atrocities since the onset of the conflict, but drew special attention to the Syrian government’s
“contrary to Western media reports, Qaddafi did not initiate Libya’s violence by targeting peaceful protesters. The United
Nations and Amnesty International have documented that in all four Libyan cities initially consumed by civil conflict in
mid-February 2011—Benghazi, Al Bayda, Tripoli, and Misurata—violence was actually initiated by the protesters” and
there was no evidence that Libyan forces never targeted civilians indiscriminately).
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Findlay, supra note 108, at 6-7.
120 Id. at 5.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Syria: The Story of the Conflict, BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868 (last visited Dec. 1,
2014).
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 U.N. Human Rights Council, Eighth Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, 27th Spec. Sess. GAOR U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/60 (Aug. 13, 2014).
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continued targeting of civilians, which they say constitute “gross violations of human rights.”128
As of August 2014, the U.N. reported that Syrian government forces continued to “perpetrate
massacres and conduct widespread attacks on civilians, systematically committing murder, torture,
rape and enforced disappearance amounting to crimes against humanity.”129 They also listed as
infractions the Syrian government’s use of chlorine gas against civilians, hostage taking, and the use
of child soldiers to commit atrocities.130
While the U.N. Security Council has sought to investigate the ongoing atrocities in Syria,
and passed resolutions aimed at ending them, little has been done to stop al-Assad’s slaughter of his
people.131 In September 2013, President Obama issued an arguable “red-line” when he said that the
United States would be forced to act if Syria’s chemical weapons were further used or proliferated.132
This led many to question whether the United States had a clear point of no turning back on the
Syrian conflict, and if so, whether it comported with the R2P doctrine.133 For its part, the United
States has refused to intervene militarily to stop the al-Assad regime from committing further
atrocities against civilians in Syria, even though other measures have failed and, at times, the Obama
Administration has squarely invoked the language necessary to trigger the Responsibility to Protect.
134

Inherent in this failure is perhaps recognition that removing al-Assad would neither stabilize
the region, nor end the civil war that is also responsible for atrocities.135 That said, the reasons
the United States has avoided intervening against the Syrian government remain as unclear as they
are likely complex.136 Still, many have voiced concern that the United States and the international
community are plainly neglecting their duty to intervene, thereby undermining everything that R2P
stands for.137 USIP expert Manal Omar, citing U.N. estimates that Syrian forces had killed more
than 191,000 civilians so far in the conflict, warned, “The Syria question is one that the Obama
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Findlay, supra note 108, at 5.
132 Glenn Kessler, President Obama and the ‘Red Line’ on Syria’s Chemical Weapons, Washington Post (Sep. 6, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/2013/09/06/president-obama-and-the-red-line-on-syrias-chemical-weapons/.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 James Holmes, “Responsibility to Protect” Can’t Save Syria, The Diplomat (Feb. 1, 2014), http://thediplomat.
com/2014/02/responsibility-to-protect-cant-save-syria/ (arguing that the Security Council will not garner enough votes to
intervene in Syria, and this is the only way an intervention can be legal).
136 See, e.g., id. (arguing that no legal framework can accommodate intervention due to the divergent views of
international partners on intervention); But see Eamon Aloyo, The Responsibility to Protect and The Use of Force in Syria, The
Hague Inst. For Global Justice (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/index.php?page=CommentaryCommentary_Articles-Recent_Commentary-The_Responsibility_to_Protect_and_the_Use_of_Force_in_Syria&pid=176&id=170
(arguing that intervening in Syria is justified under R2P, but instead of asking whether that intervention empirically meets
all of the just ad bellum and R2P precautions, we should focus on whether intervention would decrease the “severity and
incidence of mass atrocities” which is still a desirable outcome).
137 See Aloyo, supra note 135 (arguing that intervening in Syria is justified under R2P, but instead of asking whether
that intervention empirically meets all of the jus ad bellum and R2P precautions, we should focus on whether intervention
would decrease the “severity and incidence of mass atrocities” which is still a desirable outcome).
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administration cannot afford to ignore.”138
Complicating the situation even more is the fact that United States and certain allies have
taken recent action to defend their own interests in Syria.139 In September 2014, in response to
the threat of expanding Islamic militancy in Syria, the United States and a handful of allies began
bombing Islamic State strongholds.140 From this, Omar expressed what is increasingly being seen
as the double standard on intervention: “Why has President Barack Obama and much of the world
rallied around the idea of stopping the Islamic State, while doing nothing about Syrian President
Bashar al-Assad’s massive bloodletting of his own people?”141
In evaluating this failure, it is important to note that it is not necessarily a result of
callousness, but rather of misguided and confused policy, political stalemate, overwhelming domestic
issues, and apprehension over repeating past mistakes Indeed, the “folly of prevention” lies mostly
in its execution, not its intention.142 Yet, it is both intention and execution that we turn our attention
to next, as this article seeks to defend the R2P doctrine as a viable national security strategy.
III. The Second Great Awakening: Emerging From the “Folly” and Providing Real
Protection
Evaluating Kosovo, Libya, and Syria provides critical insight into how the United States
should and should not respond to atrocities.143 To understand the urgency and depth of America’s
inability to uphold our Responsibility to Protect, we must first analyze the root of the problem
and establish why it poses a threat to America.144 Second, we must look at the debate over R2P to
inform, rather than completely reroute, U.S. policy.145 Finally, this article suggests specific solutions
for making the United States a leader and real contributor to R2P.

138

Manal Omar, Wanted: A Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State and Assad, U.S. Inst. of Peace (Oct. 8, 2014), http://

www.usip.org/publications/wanted-coalition-defeat-the-islamic-state-and-assad.

139 Id.
140 Max Fischer et al., The US is Bombing Syria: What We Know and Don’t Know, Vox Media (Sep. 23, 2014), http://www.
vox.com/2014/9/23/6832577/the-us-is-bombing-syria-what-we-know-and-dont-know.
141 Omar, supra note 137.
142 Doyle, supra note 89 (noting that “the Libyan intervention represents only the third time since 2005 that the
Security Council has invoked R2P to enforce the protection of civilians”).
143 Kuperman, supra note 114 (claiming that “NATO attacked Libyan forces indiscriminately, including some in
retreat and others in Qaddafi’s hometown of Sirte, where they posed no threat to civilians. Moreover, NATO continued
to aid the rebels even when they repeatedly rejected government cease-fire offers that could have ended the violence and
spared civilians”).
144 See, e.g., Erin Durkin, Hillary Clinton Criticizes Obama Foreign Policy in Interview: ‘Failure’ To Help Syrian Rebels Led
To Strong ISIS, N.Y. Daily News (Aug. 11, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/hillary-clinton-criticizes-obamaforeign-policy-interview-failure-syrian-rebels-led-strong-isis-article-1.1899301 (noting that insecurity in Syrian has led to a security
implosion and allowed ISIS to expand).
145 Int’l Dev. Research Ctr., supra note 64 at vii, 52-53 (citing that the R2P doctrine is flexible and needs to be backed
by a conversation on how to implement it, including a code of conduct implemented between Security Council members
which would compel invocation if the five precautionary measures were realized in any situation).
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A. The Root of the Problem: How the United States Thinks about R2P and Why We Must Change
Before becoming head of the APB, then-journalist Samantha Power summed up her
argument for why the United States has consistently failed in its responsibility to protect.146 First,
she said, U.S. stakeholders have a propensity for turning a blind eye, or disbelieving atrocities can
or will happen on such a grand scale.147 Second, domestic politics remains seemingly apathetic to
the plight of genocide and other atrocities, and politicians see intervention as more costly than
inaction. 148 Third, reticent to engage troops even once atrocities emerge, the United States also fails
to take preventative measures that could have stopped them. 149 Fourth, falling into well-established
theoretical traps, policymakers and politicians become mired in the debate over the “nature of the
violence in question,” and end up viewing U.S. intervention as helpless against the inevitable crises
and silencing those who advocate action. 150 In short, the United States generally does not see the
problem, does not believe it can be changed regardless of our sacrifice, and does not do anything
meaningful to impact scenarios in which the atrocities arise.
Besides the tragic and avoidable loss of human life, this dereliction of America’s duty cannot
stand for several reasons. First, if Americans do not have the requisite will to fight atrocities, those
atrocities will go unchecked and create more global instability.151 Syria is a good example of where
a localized “civil war” provided ample space for extremism to spread.152 More festering global
instability poses greater long-term threats to the U.S. homeland, our way of life, and that of our
allies.153 U.S. policymakers and R2P advocates should help the public understand these threats and
introduce R2P into the everyday lexicon as a preventative tool so America becomes more willing to
support intervention abroad – and only when it is necessary.154 Put another way, there are countless
roundtables and working groups debating R2P policy in Washington, but how many Americans
know or care about the doctrine outside of the beltway?155 How many understand how it is tied
to their domestic future and are willing to hold their government accountable for implementing
R2P?156 R2P will never get the public will behind it, if it is not talked about and championed as a
real national security tool.
146 See Power, supra note 33, at xvii-xviii.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Findlay, supra note 108, at 6 (arguing that it took only weeks for the Libya mission to shift to ousting al-Qaddafi
through the imposition of the no-fly zone and to supporting rebels).
152 Durkin, supra note 143 (claiming that the failure to support certain Syrian rebels or intervene militarily paved the
way for the security situation there to implode and allow ISIS to expand).
153 See Joshua Keating, The Mystery of ISIS’ Foreign Fighters, Slate (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_
world_/2014/11/17/are_isis_western_fighters_a_terrifying_security_threat_or_bumbling_tweeting.html (noting how ISIS is likely to
use foreign fighters trained in the crucible that has become Syria, to attack Western targets).
154 See, e.g., Richard H. Solomon & Lawrence Woocher, Confronting the Challenge of “Political Will”, U.S. Inst. of Peace
(Mar. 18, 2010),
http://www.usip.org/publications/confronting-the-challenge-political-will.
155 Id.
156 Id.
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Second, an inability to lead and act on R2P makes the United States look weak, and worse,
self-absorbed. Whether or not President Obama drew ‘red lines’ on Syria is immaterial when, even
in the face of known atrocities, the United States still hesitates to act. The fact is, the United States
and their international partners know what is going on in Syria.157 Stakeholders should not have to
threaten action in a tired waiting game while more civilians die over a period of years.158 Instead the
international community should not hesitate to act when the R2P triggers are met and the United
States must take the lead, as they did in Kosovo, in convincing allies to take collective action.159 To
do anything less makes R2P look empty. Invoking R2P and, when necessary, the use of military
force, would help avoid making our commitment to the doctrine and to genocide prevention look so
hollow.
Finally, not acting – not testing our capability in legitimate situations concerning atrocities
– prevents the United States from adopting lessons learned.160 Similarly, replacing those legitimate
instances with operations under the guise of R2P, but that are really for other political ends,
degrades the capital necessary to act when people are actually in danger.161 If one thing is clear
from the United States’ humanitarian intervention strategy, it is that we need to learn how to do it
better.162 For these reasons, the United States must strive to engage when R2P is triggered and stay
out of the fray when it is not. This will take more careful fact checking than in Libya, and more
resourceful use of our intelligence and military capabilities, but it can be done.
These general outlines on why failing at the Responsibility to Protect is unpalatable for
the United States lead us next into an evaluation of the criticism and support for humanitarian
intervention. Understanding this debate is crucial to framing a solution for the United States to
prioritize and act on its duty.
B. Critical Considerations: Allowing the Debate Over Humanitarian Intervention to Shape Better Policy – Not
Undermine It Entirely
The debate surrounding intervention is very polarizing and roughly aligns with the differing
schools of thought present among international relations theorists on how to best address intra-state
or regional conflict.163 While there are valid arguments on all sides, critics of the Responsibility to
Protect have favored abandoning the doctrine altogether.164 Before suggesting solutions for a better
157 U.N. Human Rights Council, supra note 126.
158 Findlay, supra note 108, at 7-8 (submitting that not acting is just as bad as acting when there is no legitimate
invocation of R2P – both undermine the doctrine and call into question the efficacy of the doctrine).
159 See Power, supra note 33, at 447 (recounting how the U.S. sought support for peace talks and rapid NATO action
should the Serbians refuse to comply with Western allied demands to stop killing in Kosovo).
160 See Aloyo, supra note 135 (arguing that more focus must be placed on whether intervention would decrease the
“severity and incidence of mass atrocities,” which is still a desirable outcome); See also Kuperman, supra note 114 (arguing
that there are lessons that must be learned from instances where R2P has been incorrectly applied, because there are still
outstanding insecurity concerns).
161 Findlay, supra note 108, at 5.
162 See Aloyo, supra note 135.
163 Omestad, supra note 22.
164 Holmes, supra note 134.
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R2P strategy, it is important to analyze the arguments on either side of the R2P debate. This article
adopts the view that arguments against R2P are not compelling enough to flatly reject the doctrine.
Rather, they serve as an opportunity to shape a more sound R2P policy.
i. Cost, Benefit, and The Stain of Precedent: The Case Against Humanitarian Intervention
Critics have argued that the humanitarian intervention record over the past twenty years
reveals that the costs are not worth their effects. In scholar Benjamin Valentino’s estimation,
this negative cost-benefit ratio requires the United States to abandon humanitarian military
intervention in favor of a new development-centric U.S. policy focused on public health, disaster
relief, and refugee assistance.165 Analyzing conflicts on a case-by-case basis, Valentino points out
that “Although humanitarian intervention has undoubtedly saved lives, Americans have seriously
underappreciated the moral, political, and economic price involved.”166 The costs, according to
Valentino, include seven distinct consequences, which this article separates into two categories:
assumable and manageable risks, and lessons-based imperatives that can be used to help redefine the
United States’ R2P strategy.
The first three of Valentino’s critiques fall into the assumable and manageable risks category.
First, Valentino argues that humanitarian intervention means inevitably arming rebel factions with
whom we rarely share similar values, respect for human rights, or long-term goals.167 Second, he
contends that because humanitarian intervention often uses military means, by default, it furthers
the same loss of innocent human life that it is trying to stop.168 Third, he asserts that intervention
allows the enemy to galvanize and mobilize against the intervening party, often hastening their
genocidal efficacy.169
However, to a certain extent, these first three consequences all may be avoided or mitigated.
Take, for example, the advancement of intelligence capabilities, which have helped better predict and
respond to crises, allow warfighters to reduce civilian casualties, and empower policymakers to more
accurately weigh strategic risks and gains.170 When weighed against the costs of not reacting, those
mitigating strategies prove negligible at the least.
Valentino’s remaining critiques present further reaching implications and present risks that
are admittedly harder to mitigate or assume. However, classifying them as lessons learned, rather
than unchangeable truths, casts light on how the United States might reconfigure its R2P policy.
Using the First Gulf War as an example, Valentino maintains that intervention falsely encourages
victims to rise up against brutal regimes – and often leaves them without the necessary support

165 Benjamin Valentino, The True Costs of Humanitarian Intervention:
The Hard Truth About a Noble Notion, Foreign affairs (Nov./Dec. 2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136542/
benjamin-a-valentino/the-true-costs-of-humanitarian-intervention.
166 Id.; See also Bello, supra note 32.
167 Valentino, supra note 164.
168 Id.; See also Doyle, supra note 80.
169 Valentino, supra note 164.
170 Western, supra note 29.
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to continue fighting their oppressors.171 Imagine however, if no rebellion had been urged in Iraq
in 1991, or if before it was, the United States was in place and ready to assist. The outcome then
probably would have been different – or at least more controllable and resulting in fewer casualties.
Valentino continues, declaring that precedent for conducting NATO-led operations
without U.N. Security Council approval has undermined the United Nations as the rightful leader
of intervention operations.172 Perhaps, though, R2P requires more flexibility than what the U.N.
Security Council can provide; if that body cannot or will not act, it need not be the one that
determines whether intervention is appropriate.173 Certainly, the intractable positions and interests
of the Security Council’s members continue to make it unlikely that each will agree when and how to
act, especially in Syria. This does not mean that intra-state atrocities should go unchecked.
Valentino also reasons that intervention degrades the United States’ standing among other
international powers, and that allies no longer trust America’s handling of geopolitical crises.174
However, the same could be said of America’s failure to act and uphold our core values throughout
the world. Here, the choice is a matter of losing some trust or losing our identity completely.
Finally, Valentino finds that intervention results in “lost opportunity costs” wherein the
money used to conduct operations could have been used to advance public health initiatives and
other life-saving humanitarian measures.175 It is true that there are many military and humanitarian
priorities in the world today, but R2P is a long-term investment that goes beyond building public
health or other infrastructures in places where security is still at an overwhelming deficit. Although
it appears that the R2P investment may be too high in the short term, it stands to ultimately help
lessen the world’s problems in the long run by improving quality of life through the provision of
basic human security first – put another way, infrastructure development cannot meaningfully occur
without a safe and secure environment that facilitates service delivery in the first instance.
Valentino, like many critics, leaves the door open for very limited humanitarian intervention
only when absolutely necessary. He reasons that one such instance might be in the case of border
closures where oppressive regimes prevent the flight of refugees.176 However, this brand of purely
reactionary intervention neglects to address the root cause, provide for those who are unable to
flee, and still begs the basic question: what is “enough” brutality to know that the line has been
crossed and that military intervention is necessary? Of course, for each of these critiques, there are
worthwhile counterpoints to which we now turn.
ii. What Humanity Requires: The Case for Humanitarian Intervention
Others, taking a broader and more human view of the net gain yielded by humanitarian
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Bajoria, supra note 7 (noting that some experts have questioned the future of R2P as uncertain and raised the
point that acting outside of the U.N. is still murky legal water).
174 Valentino, supra note 164.
175 Id.
176 Id.
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intervention, believe there is no replacement for the Responsibility to Protect.177 Supporters
point out that R2P has decreased the overall prevalence of global conflict, lowered the amount
of lives lost in those conflicts, and institutionalized international norms against violence – all
critical advancements in their own right.178 Western and Goldstein sum up this view, noting that
humanitarian intervention belongs squarely in the “growing tool kit of conflict management
strategies that includes today’s more robust peacekeeping operations and increasingly effective
international criminal justice mechanisms.”179
Notwithstanding views on whether humanitarian intervention has had a positive or negative
effect, proponents have also argued that the responsibility to intervene is a moral imperative and
therefore, cannot be weighed in terms of cost-benefit ratio. Rather, humanitarian intervention, with
R2P as its decisive manifesto, requires members of the international community to do what is right as
fellow members of the human race – that is, protect those that are most vulnerable.180 Ambassador
Power notes, however, that the moral imperative has rarely ever been sufficient to promote action.181
She submits that the morality argument has often had to be combined with one of self-interest to
get people to listen.182
While the moral imperative argument may not be sufficient, it is nonetheless valid and
necessary. Every day, the United States asks others to honor democracy, human rights, and freedom.
The hypocrisy of the United States failing to do as they preach further weakens our political capital,
creates a generation of dissidents, and leaves open, rather than secures the future of freedom for
our posterity. Even if actors cannot agree that R2P is the right thing to do, certainly there must
be some recognition that international stakeholders need to set a precedent for protection or risk
undermining the efficacy of the U.N.183 This is where self-interest factors into otherwise altruistic
decision-making.
C. What Can the United States Do to Build Consensus, Lead on R2P, and Stop Atrocities
Failing in our responsibility to protect is neither advisable nor sustainable. In order to respond
to this failure, the United States must take measures to correct course.184 As this article seeks to define
how the United States might better fulfill its recognized R2P obligations, the following suggests ways
America can clarify its humanitarian intervention strategy and become a global leader in the R2P
movement.185 Ultimately, though, no strategy is complete without a willingness to follow through.
177 See, e.g., Power, supra note 18, at 512.
178 Western., supra note 29.
179 Id.
180 Citation needed. [HAS THIS BEEN RESOLVED?]
181 Power, supra note 33, at 512.
182 Id.
183 Int’l Dev. Research Ctr., supra note 64, at 52-53 (recognizing that there will be times when the Security Council
fails to act given the veto power of the five permanent member states, and that the international community needs to
force the U.N. to be accountable by putting pressure on the body to fulfill its mandate in those instances).
184 See, e.g., Bajoria, supra note 7 (noting that the United States has tempered its use of R2P in recent years, likely to
due to the myriad challenges they encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan where they led intervention missions).
185 Id.
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Therefore, this article concludes with a recommendation that the United States act in the face of
ongoing humanitarian crises.
First, the United States should seek to reinvigorate the dialogue on the Responsibility to
Protect, elevating action on R2P as a national priority and changing public discourse on the topic.186
To the extent that the shortfalls of past conflicts continue to inhibit our capability to have an honest
discussion about genocide and atrocities today, the two need to be separated.187 This can be achieved
at relatively low cost by publicly recognizing that the United States has a moral duty to protect and
making a clear case for what national security interests are implicated in atrocity situations.188 As a
precursor to this dialogue, policymakers also need to recognize where R2P has not been used at the
right times and for the right purposes, such as in Syria and Libya.
Second, the U.S. must take stock of our current laws mandating action in the face of genocide,
and reevaluate where they are inadequate, ambiguous, or plainly not being followed. As mentioned
in Part I of this article, the Genocide Convention is so saddled with burdensome requirements that
it remains largely meaningless as a legal basis for invoking U.S. action.189 This necessitates a deeper
look at what purpose the Convention serves in the U.S. legal regime, as well as what form potential
legislative amendments must take in order to trigger U.S. action.190 Likewise, the Responsibility to
Protect roundtable in Washington should undertake a comprehensive policy review to extract lessons
learned and recommend a way ahead for policymakers to pursue reform. U.S. policymakers would
also be well advised to revisit the document that introduced the Responsibility to Protect, and craft
responses that would put into action the recommendations made in that document.191
Third, the U.S. must re-establish (or establish in the first place) credibility in identifying
human rights atrocities worthy of invoking R2P. This can be accomplished by creating a special
standing joint task force that uses the vast intelligence and military resources at our disposal to identify
atrocities.192 Policymakers should press the intelligence community to produce intelligence that helps
to identify specific threats to civilians and use that intelligence to shape policy recommendations. This
information should be shared with international stakeholders, and a more comprehensive analytical
framework developed to keep all participants apprised of developments underlying genocide and
human rights atrocities.193
Fourth, the United States must lead efforts to promote sustainable peace in post-genocide
186 Solomon, supra note 133 (arguing that garnering enough political will to act is the biggest challenge to R2P, but
that this requires making the case for which national interests are implicated, fleshing out what contrary interests exist,
especially among members of the Security Council, and harnessing the power of the media to communicate a clear case
for action so the public and stakeholders demand accountability).
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Kaufmann, supra note 12; See also Bajoria, supra note 7 (noting that the United States has tempered its use of R2P
due to past bed precedent and the ambiguity of a workable legal framework for compelling action).
190 See, e.g., Bajoria, supra note 7 (noting that the United States has tempered its use of R2P due to past bed precedent
and the ambiguity of a workable legal framework for compelling action).
191 See, e.g., Int’l Dev. Research Ctr., supra note 64.
192 See, e.g., Lawrence Woocher, Conflict Assessment and Intelligence Analysis, U.S. Inst. of Peace (Mar. 18, 2010), http://
www.usip.org/publications/conflict-assessment-and-intelligence-analysis.
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situations, and to stabilize the situation in pre-conflict areas. This starts with the United States being
a stronger advocate for R2P in general, but it ranges up to being able to circumvent U.N. inaction
and invoke the power of NATO to respond to real or looming atrocities – although, not without
first taking every measure to push the Security Council to act and the U.N. to fulfill its mandate.194
Although conventional wisdom tells us that collective action can be legitimate, but not necessarily
legal, if international community members act without the approval of the U.N. Security Council,
this concept too must be reevaluated.195 The U.N. Security Council is hobbled by having to entertain
sometimes diametrically opposed interests, as evidenced in their inability to authorize military action
by resolution in cases where genocide was patently clear.196 Even when it elects not to act, that fact
should not end the discussion on protection.
Finally, and underlying all of these recommendations, the United States should act with
appropriate force when genocide, war crimes, and human rights atrocities occur.197 It should be clear
when military action will be used – not threatened and then never executed, or used solely to topple
regimes.198 This action starts in Syria, where many continue to die at the hands of a brutal regime.199
Acting does not necessarily mean regime change, although it could if that is what the situation calls
for. It also does not mean supporting rebel groups who are fighting to later harm people. Any action
must comport, to every extent possible, with basic principles laid out by the International Commission
on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s initial manifesto.200
IV. Conclusion
Genocide, war crimes, and human rights atrocities are blights on humanity. Unfortunately,
the international community has been unable to prevent the conflicts that produce these events.
Impediments to prevention are only likely to increase as global instability rises. However, the past
and the future should not deter action today. The United States can and should prevent the further
degradation of global and human security by resetting the intervention discussion, prioritizing R2P
as a key national security doctrine, and rallying fellow stakeholders in support of collective action
when necessary. Though some believe the Responsibility to Protect is a thing of the past, the
United States and their international partners cannot take the risk of abandoning our duties toward
humanity or discarding a critical national security instrument.
194 Int’l Dev. Research Ctr., supra note 64, at 52-53.
195 See Aloyo, supra note 135 (arguing that more focus must be placed on whether intervention would decrease the
“severity and incidence of mass atrocities,” which is still a desirable outcome).
196 See, e.g., Bajoria, supra note 7(noting that the United States has tempered its use of R2P due to past bed precedent
and the ambiguity of a workable legal framework for compelling action).
197 Kaufmann, supra note 12; See also Bajoria, supra note 7 (noting that the United States has tempered its use of R2P
due to past bed precedent and the ambiguity of a workable legal framework for compelling action).
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199 Id.
200 Int’l Dev. Research Ctr., supra note 64, at xii-xiii (requiring that (1) the primary intention had to be to end human
suffering; and (2) military action had to be used only as a “last resort”; (3) applied only through proportional means; and
(4) with, reasonable prospects of success).

